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Abstract 
 
How do we feel our body in emotion experience? In this paper I initially distinguish 
between foreground and background bodily feelings, and characterize them in some 
detail. Then I compare this distinction with the one between reflective and pre-reflective 
bodily self-awareness one finds in some recent philosophical phenomenological works, 
and conclude that both foreground and background bodily feelings can be understood as 
pre-reflective modes of bodily self-awareness that nevertheless differ in degree of self-
presentation or self-intimation. Finally, I use the distinction between foreground and 
background bodily feelings to characterize the experience of being absorbed in an 
activity, as opposed to accounts that imply that absorption involves bodily 
inconspicuousness. 
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I. Introduction 
 
What is it like to feel an emotion? As is well known, William James (1890) could not 
imagine experiencing an emotion without experiencing bodily feelings as well. He 
actually identified emotion with “our feeling of the [bodily] changes as they occur” 
(James 1890, p. 449). In a similar vein, Carl Lange (1885, p. 66) wrote: “[t]ake away 
the bodily symptoms from a frightened individual […]; what remains of his fear?”. As 
is also well known, the claim that bodily changes are sufficient or even just necessary 
for emotion has been criticised several times, for different reasons, and many attempts 
have been made to disprove it empirically (for overviews see e.g. Frijda 1986; 
Cornelius 1996; Prinz 2004).  
In this paper I will not be concerned with the question of whether experiencing 
bodily feelings is necessary and/or sufficient for experiencing emotion. How one goes 
about tackling this issue and answering the question depends very much on what one 
takes bodily feelings to be (e.g. are they limited to visceral sensations? Or do they 
include musculoskeletal sensations?). Also, as it will become clearer below, it depends 
very much on how one understands the phenomenon of “experience” or, better here, 
“self-awareness”. In this paper I rather start from the assumption that, as embodied and 
situated living organisms, we experience our body in various ways, depending on the 
context. This is the case also when we feel emotions, and the specific question in which 
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I am interested is: how do we experience our body in emotion experience? Or, in other 
words, how do bodily feelings enter emotion experience? In this paper I thus take a 
descriptive rather than a normative stance, in the sense that I am not interested in 
criteria for establishing when a bodily change does or does not feel like an emotion. I 
take it as uncontroversial (irrespective of one’s stance towards the James-Lange 
hypothesis) that we often experience our body when feeling an emotion, and what I am 
interested in is providing a detailed characterization of this experience. 
More specifically, the occasion for the discussion in this paper is a (much less 
discussed) remark by James in the same chapter of the Principles of Psychology. At 
some point he writes that, in emotion, “every one of the bodily changes, whatsoever be, 
is FELT, acutely or obscurely, the moment it occurs” (James 1890, p. 451, emphasis in 
original). This remark is not explicated or further elaborated in James’s text; as I shall 
suggest, however, one way to interpret it is by drawing an initial distinction between 
bodily feelings that are in the foreground of emotion experience, and bodily feelings 
that are in the background (section II and III, respectively). In section IV I compare the 
proposed distinction with the one between reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-
awareness as discussed in some recent philosophical phenomenological works. Finally, 
in section V I use the distinction between foreground and background bodily feelings to 
characterize the experience of being absorbed in an activity, in contrast to the view that 
in absorption the body is forgotten or inconspicuous. 
 
II. Foreground bodily feelings 
 
What about “acutely felt” bodily feelings? These seem to be the kind of feelings most 
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philosophers and psychologists have in mind when they discuss the bodily features of 
affect: in many emotion experiences, one’s body somehow “stands out” from the field 
of awareness and engrosses one’s mind—as when I perceive my heart beating very fast 
after ducking a viper suddenly spotted in the middle of the hiking trail, or when I feel a 
knot in my throat as I am to report the death of a loved one, or when I sense my 
stomach contracting as I walk by a patch of vomit on the pavement. In all these cases, 
the body comes to the foreground of awareness, as I shall put it: it comes into relief, it 
makes itself apparent, it asserts its presence.  
 As the examples above illustrate, sometimes what comes to the foreground in 
emotion experience are localized bodily sensations. Other times, the bodily feelings in 
affect can be more diffuse, i.e. they may involve the whole body, or most of it.
1
 For 
example, I may feel energized and up-beat in my whole body upon receiving good 
news; when embarrassed I may feel a large part of my body getting warm; sometimes I 
feel apathetic, heavy and encaged. Diffuse foreground bodily feelings are often best 
characterized as experiences of action readiness (Frijda 1986)—i.e. awareness of action 
tendencies or urges to act, in which one’s body is felt as wanting to move.
2
 In joy, I 
may run, jump and throw my hands up in the air—yet joy can involve merely a felt urge 
to run, jump and throw my arms up in the air, just as in anger I can merely feel like 
hitting the desk, and grabbing and shaking objects around me.  
 The diffuse character of foreground bodily feelings in emotion experience shows 
up also in how people speak—like when English speakers say that they feel “empty”, 
“drained” or “buoyant”, or when they say: “the speech stirred everyone’s feelings”, “I 
am all shook up”, “he was slightly ruffled by what he heard” (Kövecses 2000, p. 80, 
emphasis in original). One can also “tremble”, “shiver”, and “quiver all over” with 
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emotion (op. cit., p. 81). Also, interestingly some emotions are associated with specific 
whole-body metaphors. For example, angry people “blow up”, “burst out”, “blow their 
stack”, “flip their lid” or “hit the ceiling”, suggesting that anger feels like “hot fluid 
under pressure in the bodily container” (op. cit., pp. 148-9).
3
  
 These linguistic expressions and metaphors of emotion also reveal the 
dynamical and kinetic character of emotion experience. In this sense, research on 
language converges with and complements the phenomenological account developed by 
Sheets-Johnstone (1999; 2009), according to whom there is a very close link between 
emotion experience and movement.
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 Her claim is well illustrated by the fact that the 
visual arts (painting, sculpture, but also theatre and dance) draw heavily on 
representations of movement to evoke specific feelings. Many of these “kinetic 
portrayals” evoke subtle affective nuances that are not easily put into words, but whose 
specific quality is nevertheless directly grasped by the observer. In dance and theatre, 
the same movement, such as a head lift, can induce very different affective impressions 
depending on the speed at which it is executed (paintings and sculptures can also evoke 
movement, by representing e.g. humans and animals, but also objects, in specific 
actions and by exploiting light and texture). Arguably, these portrayals effectively 
evoke emotions because they enact bodily movements that are structurally analogous to 
those we often live through in our own body when we experience the portrayed 
emotions. Even music, it has been suggested, evokes emotion by reproducing the 
dynamical-kinetic character of specific emotion experiences (Gabrielsson & Juslin 
2003; Johnson 2007, chapter 11); a piece of music that feels “angry” (think heavy 
metal) arguably feels so because it mimics the kinaesthetic character of anger, with its 
sense of bodily upsurge and frantic impulse to shake and kick.  
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Localized foreground bodily sensations in emotion experience are mostly 
interoceptive, whereas more diffuse feelings involve primarily kinaesthetic sensations 
or action urges.
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 Yet in some cases one can have relatively distributed foreground 
visceral sensations, spanning for example the middle of the body from the throat to the 
lower abdomen (in my experience, sense of guilt can feel like this); in the case of felt 
temperature, the sensation can involve the whole body or most of it (as in some cases of 
embarrassment). On the other hand, relatively localized kinaesthetic sensations may 
come to the foreground in other situations, as in feeling the urge to clench one’s fists 
and punch. To complicate the picture, not only kinaesthetic, but visceral sensations as 
well have their own dynamical-kinetic character.
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 Think of the heart beating in fear, for 
example; or, in some experiences of disgust, the stomach or even throat can be felt as 
contracting and “pulling back”, so to speak. Lastly, localised and diffuse bodily feelings 
are not mutually exclusive. Localized bodily sensations (either visceral or kinaesthetic) 
can take place in a context of specific whole-body feelings—e.g. I may feel the desire to 
throw my arms up in joy in a context of feeling up-beat and energized; or, in grief, I 
may sense a painful knot in my upper stomach in a context of a more diffuse feeling of 
“weighing down”.  
To recapitulate, in this section I have suggested that James’s “acute” bodily 
feelings in emotion experience are best characterized as foreground bodily feelings in 
which the body “stands out” in the field of awareness, comes into relief and asserts its 
presence. In foreground bodily feelings the body is apparent, and I believe that it is this 
kind of phenomenon that most philosophers and psychologists have in mind when they 
discuss the nature of emotion experience and, specifically, its bodily character. Note 
that I have not aimed to identify bodily feelings that are necessary or even sufficient for 
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emotion experience. Rather, my goal has been to draw attention to some of the ways in 
which the body is felt in the foreground when we experience emotion. In this sense, in 
this section I have pointed out that the body can enter the foreground of awareness as 
more or less localized, and in various experienced dimensions (as visceral and as 
proprioceptive-kinaesthetic sensations).  
No doubt however the discussion so far will have raised the question of whether it 
is the case that bodily feelings are always in the foreground of emotion experience. 
After all, when I am scared of the free bulldog running behind me as I cycle, I am very 
much focused on the noises behind me, trying to gauge whether the dog is actually 
running towards me, or just beside me. As several emotion theorists emphasize in 
various ways, emotions are importantly directed towards objects and events in the 
world. I will address this issue in the next section. For now I will just note that this 
example does not undermine the point that bodily feelings are often in the foreground of 
emotion experience in the way described above. Yet as it will become clearer, 
foreground bodily feelings do not exhaust the ways in which one’s body can be felt in 
emotion experience. 
 
III. Background bodily feelings 
 
I will interpret James’s claim that the body is sometimes “obscurely felt” in emotion 
experience as meaning that in some cases bodily feelings can remain in the background. 
As I shall try to explain, in this case the body does not “stand out” and is not apparent, 
but it is still nevertheless felt, in the sense that it contributes to giving the emotion 
experience its specific quality, it contributes to the specific way the experience feels. 
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 Take for example the situation in which I am sitting in a delayed train 
proceeding very slowly, just before a flight. My attention is focused on particular 
objects—the time indicated by my watch, the speed of the train, the conductor’s 
announcements—rather than my body, and yet the whole experience has a quality of 
urgency characterized by a sense of tightness and confinement; when I finally relax in 
my plane’s seat, the tension that has built up in my neck and shoulders comes to the 
foreground. My suggestion here is that the quality of the anxious experience in the train 
comprised (partly at least) a background awareness of my (tense and constrained) body. 
Similar considerations apply to my fear for the bulldog running behind me as I cycle. 
The quality of the experience can be influenced, I want to suggest, by how my body is 
lived in the background. My attention is directed towards the dog, but I also sense my 
bodily vulnerability and agitation—I have a background, non-attended sense of my 
body as rigid and ready to be attacked. These background bodily experiences are part of 
my fear for the dog, they contribute to its particular feel.  
In these examples, background bodily feelings are best characterized as that 
through which a situation in the world is experienced by the subject as possessing a 
specific affective quality (such as a quality of dangerousness, of dullness, threat, 
intimidation, pleasantness, excitement, and so on). To borrow a useful metaphor, if one 
way to characterize the subjectively lived body is as a transparent window out of which 
one looks at the world (see for example the discussion in Legrand 2005), my suggestion 
here is that background bodily feelings are like coloured window glasses: in emotion 
experience one may be mainly oriented towards the world, whilst experiencing it as 
affectively toned (coloured) depending on how one’s body is felt in the background 
(depending on the colour of the glass); different emotions affect the body (colour the 
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glass) in different ways, and the affective quality of the experienced world (the 
perceived colour of the world beyond the glass) changes accordingly.  
 The notion of a bodily background of experience is not new; different 
characterizations have been proposed in various contexts, some of which come closer 
than others to what I mean by background bodily feelings in emotion experience. 
Looking at some of them will help me clarify my proposal.  
Among the scientists, Damasio (1994, pp. 149-50) distinguishes three varieties of 
feelings: feelings of basic universal emotions (such as joy, fear, anger, sadness, etc.; see 
Ekman 2003), subtle variations of those (such as ecstasy and euphoria, panic and 
shyness, etc.), and background feelings. A background feeling “is not the Verdi of 
grand emotion, nor the Stravinsky of intellectualized emotion but rather a minimalist in 
tone and beat, the feeling of life itself, the sense of being […] [it] is our image of the 
body landscape when it is not shaken by emotion” (pp. 150-1). Background feelings are 
typically unattended, but they can easily be reported: “we are only subtly aware of a 
background feeling, but aware enough to be able to report instantly on its quality” 
(ibid.). As bodily, unattended, and nevertheless “subtly felt”, Damasio’s background 
feelings resemble my background bodily feelings. Unlike the latter, however, they are 
not felt specifically during emotion experiences, but rather between them (“[a] 
background feeling corresponds […] to the body state prevailing between emotions”; 
ibid., emphasis in original); they contribute mainly to our sense of well- or ill-being, 
colouring our awareness when we are not in the grip of emotion. Whereas it is 
important to point to this kind of background bodily experience, it is also important to 
recognize that background bodily feelings can play a role in, specifically, emotion 
experiences as well.
7
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A different account of background bodily awareness is given by Leder (1990), 
who distinguishes various modes of “disappearance” of the body, namely various ways 
in which we do not pay attention to our body and our body is therefore “absent”. At 
some point (p. 24) he discusses the example of a person who starts listening to music 
while driving. As her attention shifts to the music, the bodily movements she performs 
to drive disappear from her awareness: they are relegated to the background of a bodily 
“I can” from where they can reappear if needed. Leder’s term for this mode of 
disappearance of the body is background disappearance. Note however that what I call 
background bodily feelings are not supposed to disappear in this way. In Leder’s 
example the body, once disappeared, does not influence the experience of what is 
central in the subject’s awareness at the moment (i.e., in the example, the music). 
Background bodily feelings, on the other hand, do contribute to the quality of one’s 
current emotion experience. 
Leder (1990, chapter 2) also talks of deep, recessive visceral processes that we 
never feel, and yet support our organism and its conscious life. This form of background 
is even further removed from the one I am trying to point out, because here the 
background cannot be brought to attention (although it may become felt in some cases 
of pain and illness); in other words, Leder’s “recessive body” is not transparent in any 
sense, but rather entirely “invisible” (to borrow Legrand’s 2007 term). Leder’s 
discussion comes closest to my notion of background bodily feelings when it 
acknowledges that the absent body can be felt indirectly via a change in how the world 
is experienced. In hunger, for instance, Leder (1990, pp. 51-2) notes that the whole 
corporeal field can be affected and, importantly, “since my corporeal field is always in 
relation to a world, the visceral saturates my environment as well. […] The world itself 
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shifts with a shift of the visceral”.  
 Yet another account of background bodily awareness is to be found in 
Gurwitsch (1964; 1985). Gurwitsch maintains that “feelings of central adjustment as 
well as other bodily feelings may accompany mental activities and […] some awareness 
or other of our corporeity is actually there at every moment of conscious life” (1985, p. 
28). He also comments that this pervasive bodily awareness can be particularly “dim 
and indistinct” (p. 31). Although he does not discuss emotion, his account thus seems to 
leave room for the possibility that a kind of dim and indistinct bodily awareness (akin to 
background bodily feelings) may characterize some emotion experiences.  
 Crucially, however, for Gurwitsch bodily awareness, even if pervasive, is 
always irrelevant to what is going on centrally or focally in the subject’s attention. 
More precisely, Gurwitsch distinguishes three “domains” or “dimensions” of 
consciousness that are supposed to be simultaneous and unified within each conscious 
act: 
 
First, the theme: that with which the subject is dealing, which at the given moment 
occupies the ‘focus’ of his attention, engrosses his mind, and upon which his 
mental activity concentrates. Secondly, the thematic field which we define as the 
totality of facts, co-present with the theme, which are experienced as having 
material relevancy or pertinence to the theme. In the third place, the margin 
comprises facts which are merely copresent with the theme, but have no material 
relevancy to it.
8
 (Gurwitsch 1964, pp. 55-6, emphasis in original)  
 
For example, the sentence that I am writing right now is the theme, the thoughts and 
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chains of inferences that are relevant to what I am writing now make up the thematic 
field, and the awareness of my legs stretched under the desk belong to the margin. 
 Now, Gurwitsch is very clear that he takes bodily awareness to be always in the 
margin (unless of course the body is itself the theme, as when I examine the wrinkles of 
my hand). As such, bodily awareness can be co-present with the theme (indeed, as we 
saw, it is pervasive), but it can never influence it. The theme is completely indifferent 
to, and disconnected from, the margin; the latter does not in any way concern the 
contents of the theme, and can only “interfere” with it by becoming itself thematic 
(Gurwitsch 1985, p. xliv).  
 As I want to characterize them, however, background bodily feelings in emotion 
experience are not marginal; they are not completely irrelevant or unrelated to what 
“engrosses one’s mind” at a given time. Take again the example of my fear of the dog. 
If we apply Gurwitsch’s tripartion (but note that he never discusses the case of emotion 
experience), the theme is the dog, or rather the noises it makes behind me; the thematic 
field comprises the thoughts that it may bite me, that I could bleed or fall from the bike, 
etc.; the margin is made up by an indefinite number of co-present yet unrelated 
conscious thoughts, perceptions, bodily feelings, etc., including the awareness of my 
body as rigid and ready to be attacked. The latter is thus contingent and irrelevant to the 
theme, i.e. it cannot influence its contents; at most, the body can enter the focus of 
attention and become itself thematic, thus interfering with the initial theme.  
 This account overlooks however that the theme, in the example, is not just the 
noises made by the dog, but the danger they signify for me. I am afraid and, in fear, 
what I am focusing on is the danger. In this sense, what engrosses my mind is not 
indifferent to how I feel my body in the background. Were I to feel my body as immune 
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to dog-bites or as strong enough to kick the dog away if it attacked me (and assuming 
that I am not cino-phobic), my experience of the affective quality of the situation would 
be different. I might not experience it as dangerous anymore; or I might still experience 
it as dangerous, but with a very different sense of the coping capacities of my body—
which, I want to suggest, would change the quality of my fear.  
 In sum, Gurwitsch acknowledges the existence of an unattended dimly felt and 
indistinct bodily awareness that resembles my background bodily feelings. Yet he 
relegates bodily awareness to a marginal background which, even if pervasive and 
always co-present with the theme, does not in any way affect the latter. Background 
bodily feelings, however, are not marginal in this sense. In being able to contribute to 
the affective quality of a situation, they can affect the theme. 
 Sartre’s [1943] (1958) notion of ground (which was influenced by Gestalt 
psychology) comes closer to my background, even though Sartre does not discuss this 
notion in relation to the specific case of the body. For Sartre, acts of attention constitute 
specific perceptual objects as forms (Gestalten) that detach themselves from a ground. 
The ground however does not cease to be perceived; it is still laterally or peripherally 
attended, and as such it is part and parcel of the experienced world. See for example the 
passage in which Sartre is looking for his friend Pierre in a café (op. cit., pp. 9-11). 
Pierre is not there, and as Sartre scans the café looking for him, its various parts shift to 
the ground and become objects of a merely lateral attention. Yet this ground remains 
part and parcel of Sartre’s experience of the situation, in particular of his experience of 
Pierre-as-absent. Similarly, I want to suggest, in emotion experience bodily feelings can 
shift to the ground or background, whilst remaining part and parcel of the subject’s 
experience, contributing to the specific experience it is. 
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With some caution, other examples from Sartre can help characterize background 
bodily feelings. As Sartre discusses in another passage of Being and Nothingness [1943] 
(1958, pp. 331-9), one experiences physical pain “implicitly” (p. 332, emphasis in 
original), by experiencing the world in an altered way. In Sartre’s example, he is sitting 
late at night trying to finish reading a philosophy book, and: 
 
at the very moment that I am reading my eyes hurt. Let us note first that this pain 
can be indicated by the world; i.e., by the book which I read. It is with more 
difficulty that the words are detached from the undifferentiated ground which they 
constitute; they may tremble, quiver; their meaning may be derived only with 
effort, the sentence which I have just read twice, three times may be given as ‘not 
understood,’ as ‘to be re-read.’ (p. 132) 
 
We can take this example as illustrating a background bodily pain which is not 
attended, but nevertheless influences the experience of the world. The caveat, however, 
is that Sartre’s own conception of consciousness does not allow him to say that the body 
in this example experiences itself as painful (see discussions in Fell 1965; Wider 1997; 
Sveneaus 2009). Consciousness for Sartre is “vacuous” and becomes “something” only 
when attended by the other’s regard (or by the subject looking at itself from the 
perspective of the other). Thus a painful consciousness cannot properly inhabit my 
body, and my body cannot in itself feel painful. My pain is either indicated by how the 
world is given to me (in which case my body is entirely “passed over”), or made known 
to me as an object by the other’s regard.
9
 
Likewise for Sartre’s [1939] (1962) discussion of the emotions. Here Sartre at 
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some point claims that “during emotion, it is the body which, directed by the 
consciousness, changes its relationship with the world so that the world should change 
its qualities” (p. 65). Specifically, the world acquires for the subject “magical qualities” 
of e.g. dangerousness, sadness, and so on. Importantly, for Sartre this takes place via a 
transformation of the whole body: the body, by undergoing physiological changes 
distinctive of specific emotions and by being guided by consciousness, leads to an 
experience of the world as having a specific affective quality. Again, on his own 
account of consciousness, Sartre cannot say that the body which is upset in emotion, 
and through which consciousness transforms the world, experiences itself as upset (see 
also Fell 1965, pp. 202-3). In emotion the body is used by consciousness to change the 
world; consciousness even degrades itself in this process, but the body never 
experiences itself.  
In background bodily feelings, on the other hand, the world comes to be 
experienced as having specific affective qualities via a body that is in some sense felt—
not explicitly, but in the background. We can keep Sartre’s central idea that the 
affective quality of the world is experienced through the body, by specifying however 
that the latter is not merely directed and “passed over” by consciousness, but is and 
remains inhabited by it. 
Ratcliffe’s (2008) existential feelings are in many respects like background bodily 
feelings—even though they are meant to correspond to a broader and more 
“fundamental” (from an existential point of view) class than emotional feelings. 
Existential feelings are “background orientations through which experience as a whole 
is structured” (p. 2); they affect the way reality is experienced by the subject, and 
include e.g. feelings of the surreal, the unfamiliar, the uncanny, feelings of comfort, 
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feeling at home, etc. Ratcliffe also calls them “feelings of being”, feelings of how one 
finds oneself in the world. At the same time, existential feelings are bodily feelings 
through which things are experienced (p. 36). The feeling body in existential feelings is 
the medium through which one experiences and makes sense of the world; importantly 
however, it does not completely disappear from awareness. Rather, it remains felt as 
that which does the feeling (see e.g. p. 106). One way in which Ratcliffe illustrates this 
point is via the analysis of the experience of various psychiatric conditions. He shows 
that often these conditions involve an altered sense of reality that goes together with 
altered bodily feelings. The latter are not necessarily attended, but even so their altered 
nature contributes to alterations in one’s sense of world-belongingness. 
Finally, it is worth noting that some clinical practices also refer to a background 
of bodily awareness. Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT), for example, 
makes use of various body-focused exercises (such as body scans, mindful breathing, 
mindful walking, etc.) to render subjects increasingly aware in their daily lives of bodily 
feelings that are usually unattended and in the background. One purpose of increasing 
bodily awareness is to enable subjects to become better at detecting the onset of 
unwanted and unwholesome emotion experiences, thus improving their capacity for 
self-regulation (see Williams et al. 2007). 
 In sum, in this section I have suggested that it is possible to identify a level of 
background bodily feelings that are not attended and not even apparent, but that are 
nevertheless felt, in the sense that they contribute to the specific quality of an emotion 
experience; in particular, they can shape or “colour” the affective quality of a situation 
by being that through which the world is experienced. I have tried to clarify this notion 
by comparing it with existing discussions of background bodily awareness, indicating 
18 
analogies and differences.  
 
IV. Comparison with reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness 
 
I will now compare foreground and background bodily feelings with the distinction one 
finds in philosophical phenomenology between reflective and pre-reflective self-
awareness, and specifically between reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness. 
As Zahavi (2005) discusses in detail, most phenomenologists agree that one can be self-
aware (i.e. aware of oneself) in a reflective, as well as non-reflective or pre-reflective 
way.
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 In reflective self-awareness, one’s self is reflected upon and thus objectified—as 
e.g. when one considers his or her own intentions or actions to assess whether they are 
appropriate to a certain situation. In pre-reflective self-awareness, one’s self is 
experienced or lived through as the subject of awareness, without any process of 
reflection on itself. As Zahavi (2005) emphasizes, all my conscious experiences include 
a minimal form of pre-reflective self-awareness, in that they are all non-reflectively 
experienced as mine. In other words, all my conscious experiences are always and 
necessarily given to me in the first person, immediately and directly; for example, when 
I smell freshly baked bread, I need not stop and think in order to realize that it is my 
experience; rather, the experience has an immediate quality of “mineness” (Zahavi 
2005, pp. 124-32). 
 One can be reflectively and pre-reflectively self-aware in many respects—e.g. of 
one’s own memories, desires, intentions, etc. Specifically, when self-awareness refers to 
awareness of one’s own body, it is called bodily self-awareness. I am reflectively aware 
of my bodily self when e.g. I try to gauge whether I have gained weight by pinching the 
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fat on my stomach or by looking at the shape of my body in the mirror. Pre-reflective 
bodily self-awareness, on the other hand, involves directly and immediately living 
through one’s own body, as when I am immersed in a specific activity (such as writing 
this paper) and my attention is thus not on my bodily self. In this case my body is 
however not completely invisible or absent from my experience either. In fact, I am 
(pre-reflectively) aware that I am writing through my typing hands, for example; or that 
I occupy a specific position in relation to the computer screen, etc. As Legrand (2007) 
summarizes it, reflective bodily self-awareness is a thematic, observational 
consciousness of one’s own body as an object, whereas pre-reflective bodily self-
awareness is an unmediated, nonthematic way of being aware of one’s bodily self as the 
subject of one’s experiences.
11
  
How does this distinction map onto the one between foreground and background 
bodily feelings drawn above? Prima facie, background bodily feelings would appear to 
be pre-reflective (they are clearly unheeded and unattended), whereas foreground bodily 
feelings would appear to be reflective. Pre-reflective self-awareness is often 
characterized as a hidden, marginal, almost non-conscious level of consciousness; 
correlatively, any experience that is not marginal but rather “at the front”, self-affirming 
and mind-engrossing tends to be characterized as thematic and reflective. Petitmengin 
(2007, p. 55), for example, writes: “we use the term ‘pre-reflective’ in order to 
emphasize the fact that this dimension is not unconscious, but only not yet conscious”. 
She is particularly interested in developing methods (such as interviews) that enable 
people to become aware of a variety of pre-reflective material. The latter is assumed to 
be hidden, at the fringe, non-conscious, and the subject needs the help of a second 
person to turn attention to this material and thereby to become aware of it.  
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Or, consider again Leder’s (1990) reflections on the absent body, this time his 
account of pain. In his example, a tennis player is entirely absorbed in the game when 
he suddenly feels an acute pain in his chest. Prior to the onset of the pain, his body is 
absent, not attended (in various ways); as the pain suddenly appears, the tennis player 
refocuses his attention on the state of his body. As Leder puts it: “[a] background 
region, the chest, is now thematized” (p. 71); and “[t]he sensory insistence of pain 
draws the corporeal out of self-concealment, rendering it thematic” (p. 76). Moreover, 
for Leder pain is alienating: the painful bodily parts appear in the specific mode of dys-
appearance, i.e. they appear as dysfunctional. In his example we thus have, on the one 
hand, a pre-reflective bodily background (the tennis-playing body) which, as such, is 
unheeded; on the other hand, we have a clearly noted localized bodily sensation (the 
pain in the chest) which, as such, is thematic and reflective. 
 Finally, take Lambie & Marcel’s (2002) account of, specifically, localized bodily 
sensations in emotion experience. The authors distinguish between what they call first-
order phenomenal experience and second-order awareness. In their view, awareness of 
individual bodily parts in emotion experience is brought about by a reflective state of 
second-order awareness, i.e. an explicit act of observation of one’s first-order 
experience.
12
 
I agree that background bodily feelings are, indeed, best characterized as pre-
reflective. They are not attended, they are not reflected upon; they are experienced, 
although only insofar as they contribute to the specific feel of an emotion experience. 
What about foreground bodily feelings however? Importantly, as I want to characterize 
it, the foreground is not attended as an object—it is not observed or reified in any way. 
In foreground bodily feelings, my body is clearly subjectively lived. It comes to the 
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front of awareness, it can even be overwhelming in its physical presence, but it does so 
in a non-mediated and non-reflective way. To borrow Lambie & Marcel’s (2002) own 
terminology (but not their view), foreground bodily feelings are instances of first-order 
phenomenal awareness; they need not be attended by second-order awareness in order 
to be experienced.  
This view of course does not exclude that I can take an attentive and reflective 
stance towards my bodily feelings and examine their object-like features: while crying 
in sadness, I may consider the saltiness of my tears; when anxious, I may put a hand on 
my chest to gauge the speed of my heartbeat. How this mode of attention influences my 
emotion experience is an interesting empirical question with important therapeutic 
implications. I may even willingly cultivate an observational stance towards my bodily 
feelings (as in MBCT), to learn to catch myself in the grip of some emotional outburst, 
and eventually to regulate my emotions. Also, sometimes the coming to the foreground 
of bodily feelings may be what leads the subject to take a reflective stance toward them. 
Indeed, this may be why, in some cases of pain and illness, the body may come to be 
experienced as alien (Leder 1990; Svenaeus 2009): when the pain becomes the object of 
attention, it becomes to some extent reified and therefore experienced as other than my 
pain. Something similar may happen in emotion experience. 
As I want to characterize them, then, both foreground and background bodily 
feelings in emotion experience can be pre-reflective, non-objectifying modes of 
awareness of one’s own body. As for the difference in how they feel, we can say that 
they differ in degree of self-presentation or self-intimation: “experiential states do 
present themselves, but not as objects. Metaphorically speaking, experiential states are 
characterized by a certain self-luminosity; they are self-intimating or self-presenting” 
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(Zahavi 2005, p. 61). The thought here is that both background and foreground bodily 
feelings are non-objectifying modes of living through one’s own body in emotion 
experience; the former, however, are somehow “less present” to oneself than the latter 
(or, continuing the metaphor of self-luminosity, they are somehow “dimmer” than the 
latter). In still other words, background and foreground bodily feelings do not differ in 
kind, in the sense that they are both pre-reflective; they differ however in degree, with 
the former being more recessive than the latter.  
That there can be different forms of pre-reflective bodily self-awareness which 
vary in degree of self-presentation is discussed by Legrand (2007) and substantiated by 
her distinction between the performative and the transparent body. As she characterizes 
it, the performative body is the body as experienced during the skilful performance of a 
specific activity,
13
 and is well illustrated with the case of expert dancers: the expert 
dancer need not reflect on her body to control her moves, but neither is her body 
entirely out of awareness and out of control; rather, in a dancer’s own words, the expert 
dancer “moves from a sharp and very present physical state” (Hermans 2003, quoted in 
Legrand 2007, p. 501). Legrand (p. 505) notes that this is a case in which bodily 
experience is pre-reflective and nevertheless “‘at the front’”.
14
 The transparent body, on 
the other hand, is a bodily experience of the world. The body here is pre-reflective in the 
sense that it is experienced as that through which one looks at the world. We normally 
primarily attend to events in our surroundings, namely we are projected or oriented 
towards the world rather than our body. Yet this world-orientation comes with a sense 
of bodily presence, of orientation and agency; the latter are not objectifying perceptions 
of one’s own body, but pre-reflective modes of self-awareness constitutive of one’s 
experience of the world. As Legrand summarizes it, “dancers mostly experience their 
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body pre-reflectively, whereas normal people in normal circumstances mostly 
experience the world in a bodily way” (p. 506, italics in original). Both are non-
reflective forms of bodily subjectivity, but the transparent body is, as I want to put it, 
more recessive, more in the background.  
Characterizing both background and foreground bodily feelings as instances of 
pre-reflective bodily self-awareness allows to eschew a possible criticism. Both Zahavi 
(2005) and Legrand (2007) warn against conceptualizing pre-reflective bodily self-
awareness as “marginal” or “peripheral” awareness of one’s own body. Specifically, 
Zahavi (p. 63) criticizes the suggestion “that our pre-reflective experience remains in 
the background as potential themes—in precisely the same way as does, say, the hum of 
the refrigerator” because, he remarks, this suggestion ultimately 
 
remains stuck in the subject-object model. It remains committed to the idea that 
our experiential life must either be given as an object or not be given at all and 
lets the only allowed variable be whether the object is given thematically or only 
marginally. This line of thought is flawed, however, since it erroneously assumes 
that there is only one type of givenness or manifestation, that of object-givenness. 
(ibid.) 
 
Likewise, Legrand (2007, p. 512) writes: “attending to something that would have been 
peripheral, thus making it central, would only allow the focus on the self-as-object, and 
not on the self-as-subject”. This caveat, however, does not apply to my discussion, 
because even though the background may be seen, in some sense, as “marginal” or 
“peripheral” when compared to the foreground, the body is not given as an object in 
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foreground bodily feelings. When background feelings come to the foreground (as when 
I feel again the headache I had forgotten during the meeting), they do not lose their 
character of pre-reflectivity. Of course, I may also take the further reflective step and 
notice “oh, my headache is back, it is really quite bad now”, but this step is not 
necessary for the headache to come to the foreground. The pre-reflective, as we saw, 
can be more or less self-presenting, and can come more or less to the front.
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In sum, the distinction between foreground and background bodily feelings does 
not map onto the one between reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness; 
foreground and background bodily feelings are both forms of pre-reflective bodily self-
awareness in which the body is subjectively lived through, and which differ in degree of 
self-intimation or self-presentation. 
 
V. The case of absorption 
 
I will now use the distinction between foreground and background bodily feelings to 
characterize the experience of being absorbed in an activity in a way that, as I shall 
argue, does more justice to its phenomenology than existing accounts. 
 The tendency to view the pre-reflective body as hidden and non-conscious goes 
together with the tendency to view absorption in an activity as primarily world-oriented 
and, correlatively, as involving an inconspicuous body. Take Leder’s (1990) tennis 
player again: before suddenly feeling a pain in the chest, the tennis player is totally 
absorbed in the game and his body is absent, or more precisely ecstatic—it is projected 
outward towards the world and away from itself (pp. 18, 21-2). The other face of this 
view is that noticing one’s own body will lead to disrupting the state of absorption. In 
25 
Polanyi’s words: “if a pianist shifts his attention from the piece he is playing to the 
observation of what he is doing with his fingers while playing it, he gets confused and 
may have to stop” (Polanyi 1958, p. 56, quoted in Leder 1999, p. 85). Ratcliffe (2008) 
also at some point observes that often, when one’s body becomes “conspicuous”, one’s 
experience of the world looses fluidity and becomes impeded: “the conspicuous body is 
[…] often a retreat from a significant project in which one was previously immersed, a 
loss of practical possibilities that the world previously offered” (p. 125). He gives the 
example of realizing, while giving a lecture, that one’s audience is getting bored (p. 
114). Before this realization, the body is inconspicuous and the lecture proceeds 
smoothly; as soon as the realization dawns, the body becomes gradually more 
conspicuous, and the fluidity of one’s gestures and speech breaks down. 
It is certainly the case that taking a reflective stance towards one’s body while 
being absorbed in an activity can disrupt one’s absorption and performance, by 
transforming one’s subjectively lived body into an object of perception. But how are we 
to understand the experience of absorption itself? Does it really involve an 
inconspicuous and forgotten body? I think that this account is inappropriate, and that 
absorption is better characterized as involving alternations of (pre-reflective) 
background and foreground bodily feelings, namely different degrees of self-
presentation or self-intimation of the lived body. 
Let us take a closer look at the example of being absorbed in playing the piano. In 
my experience, this state does not go together with an inconspicuous body. Throughout 
the activity, my bodily posture, my facial expressions, and/or the way my fingers touch 
the keys come to the foreground; I feel my body resonating with the music, with 
momentary surges of physical tension, perceived in my viscera as well as muscles, and 
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entangled with the affective quality of the music. These bodily feelings are not 
disruptive; on the contrary, they are part and parcel of the excitement, as well as of the 
enjoyment of the situation. They do not disturb the overall experience, but rather enrich 
it by adding texture to it. Now, it may happen that, while playing, I become reflectively 
aware of my facial expressions, and feel embarrassed about them (especially if playing 
in front of other people); absorption is then disrupted and I am more likely to make 
mistakes. But this is only one way in which my body can become “conspicuous”. The 
body can become conspicuous without being objectified, by being pre-reflectively 
experienced in the foreground.  
Sudnow’s (1978) first-person account of his experience of learning how to 
improvise jazz on the piano supports this description. It is clear from his report that at 
the beginning of his training he took a reflective observational stance towards his hands 
and technique. For example, he knew that “higher” and “lower” passages should 
alternate in relatively quick succession, and put this knowledge into practice by 
reflectively moving and controlling his hands; he also looked at his hands and fingers 
most of the time. As he improved, however, he shifted to a more embodied and non-
reflective knowing how, and began to be guided more by touch and proprioceptive 
sensations: “[l]ooking workload progressively lightens […] As I reached for chords […] 
I was gaining a sense of their location by going to them, experiencing a rate of 
movement and distance required at varying tempos, and developing, thereby, an 
embodied way of accomplishing distances” (p. 12). 
This more “embodied way” of playing does not lead Sudnow to, eventually, 
forget his body, and is clearly never aimed at achieving an automatic performance 
deprived of bodily presence. Rather, Sudnow’s report indicates that, with practice, he 
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learns to “submit” to the increasing skills of his hands (interestingly, in the narrative 
“the hand” gradually replaces the “I” as the improvising agent) and eventually learns to 
“sing with his fingers”—as he often likes to put it in the book. This expression aptly 
evokes a state of immersion in one’s body in which the body is however still 
experienced as a source of feeling, affect, agency, and expressivity. Sudnow’s account 
also shows a progressive expansion of bodily self-awareness, from the hands to the rest 
of the body. Here is a passage from the final part of the book which describes his 
experience as a now accomplished jazz improviser:  
 
The articulational course could now take up in downbeat synchrony with the 
foot; now in upbeat synchrony with the left hand’s rise toward a next chord; now 
in top-of-the-turnaround synchrony within the one-shoulder-sway-per-four-foot 
bounces; now jumping in on the upbeat phase of a chordal reaching arc and 
taking a soundful traverse through thus and so many places to a foot downbeat, 
one that was ‘located within’ the course of the broader reaching arc of the 
chordal stretch. (Sudnow 1978, p. 140)    
 
Not only the fingers, but the whole body is here experienced as involved in the 
performance. Even if this description is post hoc and thus necessarily reflective, it is 
hard to imagine that it could have been produced in the absence of any form of bodily 
conspicuousness. It is more plausible to grant that Sudnow is here tapping a dimension 
of pre-reflective bodily self-awareness that clearly reveals not a forgetting of the body 
but rather a dynamics of foreground and background bodily feelings, in which some 
parts of the body stand out and others shift to the background. 
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 Csikszentmihaly (1992), in his popular book on happiness, discusses many real-
life instances of what he calls the experience of flow, “the state in which people are so 
involved in an activity that nothing else seems to matter” (p. 5). One context in which 
flow-experiences come about, he argues, is when people perceive their body skilfully 
performing a specific activity, such as playing an instrument, dancing, hiking, climbing, 
practicing Yoga and martial arts, etc. (see chapter 5, titled “the body in flow”). 
Csikszentmihaly is primarily interested in identifying the various activities in which 
people experience “the body in flow”, and does not really provide a detailed 
characterization of what it is like to be in this state. What he says, however, is 
inconsistent with the view that during bodily flow the body is forgotten or 
inconspicuous—or so I want to suggest. On the one hand, Csikszentmihaly insists that a 
high level of expertise is required to experience bodily flow; expertise is necessary for 
the activity to proceed smoothly, without breakdowns and frustrations. Yet on the other 
hand he also repeatedly emphasizes the importance of feeling challenged during the 
activity, as well as feeling that one can cope with the challenge. The experience of 
bodily flow, then, must involve a delicate equilibrium of mastery and effort, such that 
the experience of being challenged and the experience of dealing with the challenge 
unfold seamlessly, in a state of uninterrupted absorption. How could such an 
equilibrium be achieved and experienced without some form of bodily 
conspicuousness? One ought to be able to feel one’s body as it is being challenged, and 
to feel when the challenge is being overcome. During bodily flow, I maintain, one does 
not forget one’s body but rather one lives it through, pre-reflectively, as actively 
immersed in a demanding but not overpowering pursuit; this condition involves a 
dynamical interplay of foreground and background bodily feelings, namely different 
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degrees of self-presentation of the body. 
Similar considerations apply to a variety of sensual experiences, most obviously 
erotic experiences, but also e.g. listening to music, enjoying a walk, exercising. They do 
not apply to pleasant experiences only however. As I am calling a relative to 
communicate the death of a loved one, I am trying not to cry, but every now and then a 
knot in my throat comes to the foreground; I push it in the background, from which it 
keeps shaping my experience, giving it a character of tightness and effort. Or, I may be 
absorbed in a boring activity, like entering dozens and dozens of marks into the 
dedicated form; it is drizzling outside and the whole experience is suffused with 
sleepiness, my face feels long, my jaws lazy and my eyelids heavy. These bodily 
feelings come to the foreground every now and then, and otherwise stay in the 
background, giving the experience of boredom its character of heaviness and slowness. 
In sum, the notions of foreground and background bodily feelings can be used to 
characterize the experience of being absorbed in an activity not merely as a case of 
bodily forgetfulness and inconspicuousness, but as a richer or better thicker experience 
in which one’s body can be felt “at the back” as well as “at the front” of awareness, 
without thereby losing its character of subjectively lived body.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
I have taken the claim that emotion experience involves bodily feelings not as an end 
point, namely a hypothesis to be confirmed or rejected, but as a starting one—that is, as 
an uncontroversial statement about the phenomenology of emotion which nevertheless 
still needs to be further elaborated and analysed. James’s remark that the body is 
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“FELT, acutely or obscurely” when we feel an emotion has served as the occasion for 
developing an account of “foreground” and “background” bodily self-awareness in 
emotion experience. The characterization of the latter, in particular, has led to 
considering other existing notions of background awareness of one’s body. Whereas 
various such notions are available, the one of background bodily feelings proposed here 
applies specifically to the case of how the body can be felt in emotion experience, and 
as such it does not appear to reduce to existing characterizations of background bodily 
experiences—even though, as shown, it does come closer to some than others.  
 The subsequent comparison of the distinction between foreground and 
background bodily feelings on the one hand, with the one between reflective and pre-
reflective bodily self-awareness as drawn in recent philosophical phenomenological 
works one the other, has helped further characterize the place of the body in emotion 
experience. I have concluded that both foreground and background bodily feelings 
should be considered experiences of one’s own body that do not objectify it. They are 
thus best characterized as different forms of pre-reflective bodily self-awareness, in 
which one’s own body is more or less recessive or self-presenting.  
 Thus understood, the distinction between background and foreground bodily 
feelings has enabled a more appropriate account of the experience of being absorbed in 
an activity. I have argued that even if in absorption one’s attention is primarily world-
oriented, one’s body is not inconspicuous but rather involves bodily experiences that 
move “back and forth” in awareness, so to speak, without being thematized and 
objectified. Such an account, I believe, ultimately allows us better to appreciate the 
thoroughly bodily character of absorption. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1
 Others have distinguished between localized bodily sensations and more diffuse or 
non-localized bodily feelings (e.g. Ryle 1949, 1951; Armstrong 1962; Scheler [1913, 
1916] 1973), although not always specifically in the context of describing emotion 
experience. Armstrong (1962), for example, does not address the case of emotion and 
limits his discussion to localized bodily sensations such as itches, pains, sensations of 
pressure, etc. 
2
 Awareness of action readiness is thus not a mere intention to act, as in intending to 
switch on the computer or intending to go swimming; an intention to act may occur 
without any bodily feeling or, for that matter, without any feeling at all. 
3
 Of course not only English speakers have bodily expressions and metaphors for 
emotion experience. Kövecses (2000) discusses analogies with Hungarian and many 
other languages. 
4
 For Sheets-Johnstone emotion experience is actually inherently kinaesthetic, i.e. it 
necessarily involves experience of bodily movement, or at least of possibilities for 
bodily movement; on the other hand, each bodily movement always has its own 
distinctive affective character. As she puts it, emotion experience and movement are 
“experientially intertwined” (1999, p. 264) and “mutually congruent” (1999, p. 265). 
We can leave the constitutive claim aside here, and just note that, indeed, we often 
experience kinaesthetic sensations in emotion, and we often perceive movement as 
affectively laden. 
5
 A reminder that in physiology, interoception refers to the perception of internal states 
of the body, as it occurs e.g. in pain, perception of bodily temperature, itch, visceral 
sensations (e.g. gut movements), vasomotor activity, hunger and thirst. Proprioception 
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refers to the perception of the size and location of one’s body and limbs; kinaesthesia, 
which refers specifically to perception of movement of one’s body, is part of 
proprioception. The interoceptive system appears to be anatomically distinct from the 
proprioceptive one; the former is associated with autonomic motor control, whereas the 
latter is part of the exteroceptive system (Craig 2003).  
6
 Sheets-Johnstone focuses on the dynamics of kinaesthetic sensations only, and does 
not discuss interoception (see Sheets-Johnstone 1999; 2009).  
7
 Emotion experience in Damasio is always the feeling or “image” of one’s body 
undergoing some changes (as in James). There is thus no room in his account for what I 
mean by background bodily feelings in emotion experience: for Damasio, either there is 
an emotion experience in which the body is the explicit object of one’s awareness, or 
there are background feelings, but only between emotion experiences.  
8
 Gurwitsch (1964) presents his distinction as an elaboration and refinement of James’s 
(1890, chapter 9) notion of fringes. Broadly speaking, the latter correspond to 
Gurwitsch’s thematic field; they are a dimly felt domain of relevancy or affinity. 
9
 This is a matter of debate and interpretation, but see the following remarks: “What 
then is this pain? Simply the translucent matter of consciousness, its being there, its 
attachment to the world, in short the peculiar contingency of the act of reading. […] 
pain as a contingent attachment to the world can be existed non-thetically by 
consciousness only if it is surpassed. Pain-consciousness is an internal negation of the 
world; but at the same time it exists its pain—i.e., itself—as a wrenching away from 
self. Pure pain as the simple ‘lived’ cannot be reached” (Sartre [1943] 1958, p. 333).  
10
 As he points out, Sartre is perhaps the best-known defender of a phenomenological 
theory of self-awareness, but relevant discussions can also be found in Husserl, 
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Heidegger, and many others. Also, Zahavi usefully reminds us that Sartre initially used 
the terms “irreflective” or “nonreflective” self-awareness, and only later came to prefer 
“pre-reflective”.  
11
 This distinction is sometimes also put in terms of the difference, especially 
emphasized by Husserl, between one’s Körper and one’s Leib. Both German terms 
translate into English as “body”, but Körper refers to the body as a physical 
(spatiotemporal) object, whereas Leib refers to the body as lived through from the 
perspective of the subject (see Zahavi 2005, p. 206). Note however that someone else’s 
Leib can be the object of my reflective awareness (I may notice someone’s 
compassionate smile, for example). 
12
 In their words: “The bodily changes are not available in experience as separate 
components (e.g., as heartbeat, temperature, tenseness) unless analytically attended in 
second-order awareness” (Lambie & Marcel 2002, p. 238); “[s]ome theorists might 
view conscious experience of bodily states, such as body temperature, muscular tension, 
abdominal sensation, lump in throat, tears welling up, as first-order emotion 
experiences. We see these experiences, however, as part of second-order emotion 
experience. They are the result of analytic attention to aspects of the bodily self” (op. 
cit., p. 239). “Analytic” here refers to one possible mode in which, according to the 
authors, attention can turn to first-order awareness (it is opposed to the “synthetic” 
mode).  
13
 See also Gallagher (2005, pp. 74, 91) for the notion of “performative awareness”. 
14
 Montero (2010, p. 113) similarly reports her conversation with a professional dancer 
who explains that, when she performs, she aims “to be totally immersed in the feeling 
of [her] body moving”. 
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15
 As Legrand (2007, p. 512) herself puts it, “the self-as-subject (or the subjective 
character of experience) is not necessarily peripheral, or marginal. Expertise (with one’s 
body as in dance, or with one’s mind as in some meditative states) can overcome this 
“self-forgetfulness” (as Husserl would put it) and put this subjective character of 
experience “at the front” of one’s experience without turning it into a mere intentional 
object”. 
